





Dispositions, Rule-Following, and Infinity* 

(Use Aqns on Undrstnd Infinty, ST q. 86 a. 2) 
The going-on problem (GOP) is the central concern of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.  It informs not only his epistemology and philosophy of mind, but also his views on mathematics, universals, and religion.  In section I, I frame this issue as a matter of accounting for intentionality.  Here I follow Saul Kripke's lead.  My departure therefrom follows: first, a criticism of Wittgenstein's “straight” conventionalism and, secondly, a defense of a solution Kripke rejects.  I proceed under the assumption, borne out in the end, that statements of rule-following have truth-conditions and are not, as Kripke seems willing to concede, merely "assertible" in  circumstances of a specified sort.  Ultimately, my goal is to demonstrate that intending can be understood in terms of an individual's dispositions rather than those of the community to which she belongs.
I The GOP
	The GOP is posed in the following “remark” from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations:

Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond 1000—and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012.
We say to him: “Look what you’ve done!”—He doesn’t understand.  We say: “You were meant to add two: look how you began the series!”
—He answers: “Yes, isn’t it right?  I thought that was how I was meant to do it.”—Or suppose he pointed to the series and said: “But I went on in the same way.”  It would now be no use to say:  “But can’t you see…?”—and repeat the old examples and explanations.1

	In the next remark, Wittgenstein asks the question he has just implicitly posed:  “How is it decided what is the right step to take at any particular stage? … Or, again, what at any stage are we to call ‘being in accord’ with that sentence (‘add two’) (and with the mean-ing you then put into the sentence– whatever that may have con​sisted in)?”2
	These remarks may be summarized as follows: A student is shown how to add two.  Her instruction involves a rule: “examples and explanations.” She follows this rule in accordance with her teacher’s expectations up to a certain point.  But thereafter she fails to 'measure up'.  But it has yet to be shown, according to Wittgenstein, what makes the student's deviant answers wrong, if, in fact, they are incorrect.  What determines, he asks, what the right an​swers are?
	Wittgenstein also sees the GOP arising in connection with “ostensive definitions” of colors, length and, numbers.3   In one of his cases, a teacher defines ‘two’ by pointing to a pair of nuts.  But if her student thought of 'two' as “the name given to this group of nuts—” what would justify the teacher’s belief, Wittgenstein asks, that she has been misunderstood?  After all, it is not as if her definition is completely unambiguous, although generally it suffices.
	It is further contended that the teacher will not necessarily make her meaning clearer by pointing out to her student that it is a number being defined.  For the student may not understand what ‘number’ means either.4 She will then require an explanation of this concept if it is to be of assistance.  But to do so her teacher must employ “other words,” thus risking additional “misunderstandings.”
	The GOP thus arises when one considers that a student might proceed in what is commonly thought to be an errant way from even the most carefully worded set of instructions.   But that she would have misunderstood them- really deviated from what was intended- can be maintained only if there is only one correct way of taking the rule in question.  But the ordinary explanations of our practices do not seem to 'rule out' as incorrect so-called deviant ways of taking them, or so a skeptic would contend.  
	Saul Kripke gives the GOP a different twist.  He takes the above remarks to call into question the possibility of an individual forming an intention or guiding herself.  He writes:

This, then is the skeptical paradox.  When I respond in one way rather than another to such a problem as ‘68+57’, I can have no justification for one response rather than another.  Since the skeptic who supposes that I meant quus (by ‘+’, so that I should respond ‘5’) cannot be answered, there is no fact about me that distinguishes be​tween my meaning plus (by ‘+’, so that I should respond ‘125’) and my meaning quus.  Indeed there is no fact about me that distinguishes between my meaning a definite function by ‘plus’ (which determines my responses in new cases) and my meaning nothing at all.5
	Kripke arrives at this interpretation by “kicking the ladder away” from the teacher in Wittgenstein’s examples.  As those cases were presented above, it was assumed that the teacher knew what she meant by ‘add 2’ or ‘blue’.  The problem had to do with conveying those meanings via rules to a student.  Kripke's skeptic challenges the teacher to demonstrate that she herself knows just  what she intended.  It turns out that she cannot, since the instructions she gave herself are consistent with more than one extension of her practice, which is precisely why they did not determine that her student was incorrect.  Nothing about her rule shows that she intended her preferred way of going-on rather than some other.  Thus, as Kripke writes, “the entire idea of meaning vanishes into thin air.”6	
	II Wittgenstein's Conventionalism
	Wittgenstein’s answer to the GOP may be culled from remark #190: 

It may now be said: “that the way the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken”.  What is the criterion for the way the formula is meant?  It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, the way we are taught to use it.7
Here Wittgenstein claims that we can recognize how a rule should be taken, i.e., what it guides one to do, by seeing how our fellows normally ‘go on’ from it. Since there is a normal way to follow a rule- a "convention" associated with it- he concludes that there is “a way the formula is meant."  The fact that human beings generally smoothly extend their practices yields Wittgenstein's answer to the GOP.   
	Regarding yet to be considered cases, a rule’s extension is determined by way that we would treat them were they to arise.  It is these counterfactual applications of a rule with which an individual must agree if he is to correctly handle new cases.  Thus, a community’s actual and counterfactual way of applying a rule constitutes its meaning.  Rule-following rests on our inclination to form conventions.	
	Wittgenstein's conventionalism, however, raises the following question.  What grounds the belief that the members of a community are disposed to agree when it comes to applying their rules?  Why do we not expect instead “conceptual anarchy"?   What is being requested here is a fact the knowledge of which would play the same role that salt’s chemical composition plays in the prediction that all salt will dissolve- the physical basis of the community’s disposition.
	In a word, Wittgenstein’s thesis presupposes that something is causing the community to uniformly extend its practices.  Otherwise, there would be no reason to expect continual agreement.  The problem lies in accounting for the uniformity of a community’s practice in terms of a feature shared by all of its members, which, generally, is how we explain a group's behavior patterns.  Without introducing such a deterministic element into his thesis, Wittgenstein would be unable to include a community's counterfactual applications of a rule in its correct extension- for he would no reason to believe that any exist.
	Perhaps realizing this lacuna, he says near the end of the Investigations that:

If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar?— Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature.  (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.)8
	That human beings are of the same species, Wittgenstein seems to be arguing, is what accounts for their being disposed to develop conventions.  They uniformly extend their practices because they share certain biologically important features.  Given that we are of the same natural kind, there is only one way that we would extend any practice beyond the cases we have already considered- "the steps are already determined."  This, one might suppose, is one of the “very general facts of nature” upon which Wittgenstein based the possibility of rule-following.
	Wittgenstein’s claim that the biological sameness of human beings provides the ground for their shared dispositions, however, begs the question with which his inquiry began- 'what is sameness?'.  Sameness, on his view, was supposed to be a function of our collective judgment.  Thus, in arguing for the existence of a community’s disposition, it will not do for him to claim that they share certain biologically important features.  Since, on his view, for persons to be of the same kind it must be the case that they would take each other to be so.  But that all or even most persons are disposed to make such a judgment— or agree on anything else— now has been called into question.  Moreover, it would be ad hoc to claim here that human beings are biologically the same whether or not they would accept that proposition: having conceded as much, what reason is there to deny the existence of natural kinds besides Homo Sapiens? 
	The defender of “straight” conventionalism, as the above view is sometimes called, might appeal at this point to a distinction between “meaning” facts and “natural” facts, claiming that the former but not the latter are conventional.  Whether or not I intend to go on one way rather than another from a given rule would be settled, following this suggestion, by a public practice while my belonging to a particular species would be determined by custom-independent facts.  Is such a distinction, however, tenable in Wittgenstein’s system?  It raises the question of why some facts are conventionally determined while others are not.  Further, what is it about ‘meaning the same thing’ that, in contrast to ‘being of the same natural kind’, precludes a non-conventional analysis thereof?  It appears ad hoc to understand the former in terms of a community’s practice while positing a non-conventional analysis of the latter.     
 	Thus, Wittgenstein seems unable to solve the GOP by appeal to our disposition (such as it is) to form conventions.  One could concede as much and proceed to defend this account as what Kripke calls a "skeptical solution," that is, a view according to which there is no fact to the matter of following a rule the citing of which would justify correctness claims.  When pressed to defend such assertions, to which, after all, we attach a great deal of importance, its proponents would have us say, ala Hume and Wittgenstein himself at some points, 'this is just how we do things'. Remaining agnostic concerning Wittgenstein's own considered view, I propose, instead, to look elsewhere for a straight solution.
III Individual Dispositions
	Let us consider the individual disposition theory (IDT), discussed and rejected by Kripke.  According to this view, one is following a rule if and only if one is applying it as one would have had one been asked to extend it to the case at hand.  In other words, the explanation one initially gives of a practice and the additional instruction one provides in those "possible worlds" in which it is requested are normatively equivalent: both are what one intended to do in carrying it out and, as such, make up its correct extension: to have meant to do x is to have been disposed to do x. 
	To follow a rule, then, one must remember what one would have said had one been asked to apply the rule to the case at hand.  One’s memory is the faculty one uses in order to accord with one’s intentions.  If one’s memory is reliable, then one’s belief that one would have continued a practice as one is now inclined to do defeasibly justifies one's extension.  That is to say, the fact that one remembers that one was initially disposed to follow a rule in a certain way provides a reason, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to apply it in that fashion: in thus going on, one does what one intended. One’s justification here is provided by the fact that one uses a reliable fac​ulty to determine one's intention.  One need not “hypothesize” about one’s dispositions, as Kripke contends,9 rather one can attempt to recall how one would have handled the case at hand.       
	Thus, the IDT gives the fact of the matter of intending as well as the means of knowing this fact.  Kripke, however, challenges it on the grounds that it fails to provide the "normative" element essential to a theory of rule-following.  He asks, ‘why should the rule-following skeptic accept the fact that one would have done x as justification for one’s doing of x?’.10 That one meant to do x rather than y is not demonstrated, according to Kripke, by citing one's dispositions, even if one's recollection thereof is accurate.  Carl Ginet makes essentially the same point, appealing to an “objective, realist view of properties” in order to distinguish “pseudo-rule-following from the real thing.” For the latter it is not enough, according to him, to accord with how one would have reacted to the case at hand.  To follow a rule, the disposition with which one agrees must itself reflect mind-independent facts.11     
	Kripke and Ginets’ intuition, however, is based upon a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s problem.  The skeptic challenged us to specify something about a person that constituted her intending to do x rather than y.  Why could this not be her being disposed to do the former?  There is nothing normatively suspect about this fact if it is taken as constitutive of her understanding of some rule (leaving aside the Platonic question of whether or not her understanding reflects how things are objectively).  And this is the only standard Wittgenstein sought.
 	In giving one’s explanation of a practice, one gave only a sample of how one intended to engage in it.  One could have elaborated upon one's rule had one been required to do so, but one didn’t.  Still, one's samples in other possible worlds have normative significance.  Why wouldn't they, since they could have just as easily been given?  They constitute a standard one may or may not later meet. What unites them as the intended applications of a single rule, rather than several unrelated meanings, is their relationship to one’s actual explanation: each is a response to that sample, instead of other rules, and, as such, a part of how one intended to go on from it. (Again, they make up one’s rule, regardless of whether or not it has an “image” amongst the Platonic forms of rules.)  In citing (a segment of) one's rule, one attempts to impart understanding of a complete concept.  To learn it is to acquire one's disposition and, thus, realize the rationale behind one's practice.
	Thus, Kripke’s first charge proves to be unfounded.  The IDT does contain a normative element.  Out of all the ways one could go on from a rule, it singles out one's intended practice, the development of which is following the rule in question.
	Kripke also contends that the IDT fails to allow for determinate concepts, that is, concepts whose extensions are fixed.12  A concept, he argues, is applicable beyond the cases we are able to adjudicate: the finiteness of a disposition prevents it from determining how a concept ought to be extended to each one of the infinite number of situations in which it is applicable.  E.g., there is no answer one would give, Kripke claims, to an “arbitrarily large addition problem.”  Yet, if ‘what one would have done’ is to fix how one ought to proceed in using the plus sign— by adding or performing another operation— one’s disposition should yield an answer to each problem involving this sign.  But, according to Kripke, one is not disposed to provide the answer to all problems involving the plus sign: some are too long to grasp, let alone solve in a normal human life.  Peter van Inwagen makes the same claim, likening a person’s dispositions to the finite set of answers of a pocket calculator.13
	It is not true, however, that I’m not disposed, by my rule for addition, to give the answer to an arbitrarily large addition problem.  To think otherwise is to confuse my capacity or potential for doing addition with the number of ways in which it can actually manifest itself. The things to which van Inwagen refers as “dispositions” are not really dispositions at all.   They are the responses a thing can actually make.  In the case of a pocket calculator, they exhaust its “disposition” proper; not so with the adding capacity of a human being.  Compare: ‘The salt will dissolve anytime it is placed in water’, ‘I can produce the answer to any addition problem, given sufficient time’, and ‘The calculator is able to sum any two numbers if it operates long enough’.  That the first two sentences are true while the third is false points up the difference between having a disposition and being programmed to achieve a limited number of results.      
	I believe that there is an answer I would give to an arbitrarily large addition problem: it is the one I would arrive at by summing the columns of digits right to left until there are no columns left (carrying when necessary).  I cannot actually provide this sum, but that does not tell against there being another possible world, albeit physically inaccessible to our own, in which it is produced.  (Should a dying person say that there is no possibility of her completing will even if she believes that had she a little more time...?)  
	To perform the above task my brain would not need, as Kripke contends, to be "stuffed with extra matter.”14  As it is currently constituted, it enables me to do what is required: 'run down' every column summing each pair of numbers in turn (carrying when necessary).  My actual lifespan would, however, need to be extended considerably in order for me to achieve the desired result.  Kripke says that we have no way of knowing how I would respond to being (comparatively speaking) immortal.  But there is no reason to suppose that I would react in a “bizarre” fashion, altering the technique I had been employing to solve the problem.  
	We often make posthumous judgments, concerning how a person would have completed a project, based on our understanding of her established techniques.  In the above case, we need only suppose that each day the problem is left unsolved is followed by a day in which I ‘pick up where I left off’.  If there is no reason to suppose this won’t be the case in the days following someone’s death, then there is no reason to think that any day following a day my task was left incomplete will find me altering my technique.  Thus, by mathematical induction, it can be shown that in learning to add I become disposed to give the answer to any problem involving the plus sign.  How I meant to apply ‘+’ in each case is thus fixed by what I would have answered had I been asked to sum the numbers in question, no matter how large they are.15
V Conclusion
	I have argued for a solution to the going-on problem that relies on the notion of a disposition.  That a person has dispositions seems undeniable.  Presently, one need only suppose that someone learning a rule would apply it to cases not included in her instruction, were she asked to do so. Her counterfactual responses, we may further assume, would have been determined by the same sorts of factors that produce her actual performance.  There is no mystery here.  This approach seems preferable to defending Wittgenstein's thesis as a skeptical solution, thus abdicating excluded middle.  Our options, though, are exhausted by these two choices, as a "straight" conventionalism has been shown to be untenable. 
 Notes
	* I am grateful to Anthony Genova, Carl Ginet, Mitchell Green, John Humphries, George Pitcher, and Avrum Stroll for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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	15.	IDT thus refutes the key premise of Wittgenstein’s private language argument.  It does so by providing for the necessary distinction between thinking one is following the rules for such a language and following them.  These things are not necessarily conflated therein because the fact of the matter of following its rules is applying them as one would have while they were being learned, something one might erroneously take oneself to be doing.  
		To use Wittgenstein’s example, correctness is applying ‘S’ to a sensation that would have been thought of as a continuation of the defining experience.  In other words, in applying ‘S’ one’s standard is composed of what one would have said of any sensation had it been appended to the defining experience: iff one would have then thought of it as continuing S should it now be conceived of as of the same kind.  One can, of course, be mistaken concerning how one was formerly disposed, thus a correct application of ‘S’ is not necessarily what is thought of as such.
	
	
	












